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Abstract
We investigate the impact of a horizontal merger between two competitors on their
incentives to develop new products. We show that a merger raises the incentives to
innovate if and only if the merged entitys incremental gain from a second innovation
is larger than the individual prot of an innovator when both rms innovate in the no-
merger scenario. Applying this result to the Hotelling model, we nd that a merger spurs
innovation and can be benecial to consumers if the degree of product di¤erentiation is
positive but not too high.
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1 Introduction
This note contributes to the debate on the impact of mergers on innovation1 by investigating
the e¤ect of a horizontal merger between duopolists investing in the development of new
products on their incentives to innovate.
We rst consider a setup where competition is modeled in reduced form and an increase in
R&D investment raises the probability that a product innovation is achieved. We establish that
a merger raises rmsincentives to innovate if and only if the merged entitys incremental gain
from a second innovation is larger than the prot of an innovator when both rms innovate
in the no-merger scenario. We then apply this result to the standard Hotelling model with
quadratic transportation costs and nd that a horizontal merger spurs innovation if product
di¤erentiation is positive but not too high.2 We also show that the merger can be benecial
to consumers under that condition.
Our model is closely related to the one developed by Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017).
A key di¤erence between the two models is that we consider di¤erentiated products instead of
homogeneous products, which implies in particular that the merged entitys prot when both
rms innovate is higher than its prot when a single rm innovates. We show that relaxing
the homogeneity assumption can overturn the central result in Federico, Langus and Valletti
(2017), i.e. that a merger sties innovation. Our work is also related to Chen and Schwartz
(2013) who show that the gain from bringing a new product to the market can be larger
for a monopolist than to a rm that would face competition from independent sellers of the
old product.3 However, their result relies on the idea that the monopolist can coordinate the
prices of the new and the old products, while ours hinges on the fact that the merged entity
can coordinate the prices of two new products.
2 Reduced-form model
Consider an industry with two competitors, rm 1 and rm 2. Thus, a merger between these
two rms is a merger to monopoly.4 Suppose that each rm is a research lab searching for
an innovation that will create a new market. Initially, each rm is inactive in the product
market but actively conducts research. Firm i 2 f1; 2g may succeed in innovating with a
probability i that depends on the level of investment in R&D. It costs a rm C(i) to
1See e.g. Katz and Shelanski (2007), Shapiro (2012), Motta and Tarantino (2018), and Denicolò and Polo
(2018b).
2 In the limiting case of homogeneous products, we nd that a merger does not a¤ect the rmsincentives
to innovate, which in line with the central result of Sah and Stiglitz (1987).
3See Greenstein and Ramey (1998) for a related analysis in the context of vertical product di¤erentiation.
4Focusing on a merger to monopoly allows to abstract away from the response of rivals and the equilibrium
e¤ects generated by their existence. In other words, this allows to focus on what Shapiro (2010) and Federico,
Langus and Valletti (2018) call the initial impetus.
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achieve a probability i to innovate. Success is independent between rms, meaning that
whether a rm innovates or not is a¤ected by neither the other rms investment in R&D nor
the other rms success.
When a rm is the sole innovator on the market it obtains a value 1 from marketing
the product, equal to the monopoly prot. When both rms innovate, they obtain each a
duopoly prot 2 that is less than 1. For example, if the product is the same for both rms
and rms compete in prices, the value of 2 is zero. If they compete à la Cournot or if
there is some di¤erentiation between the rmsproducts, then 2 will be positive.5
Consider a rm i 2 f1; 2g ; and suppose that the other rm, denoted j; chooses an invest-
ment C (j) leading to a likelihood of innovation j : Then, the prot of rm i is
i f(1  j) 1 + j2g   C(i):
When rm i succeeds (which happens with probability i), there is a chance 1   j that
the other rm fails to innovate, in which case rm i is a monopoly, and a chance j that the
other rm succeeds, in which case rm i obtains only the duopoly prot.
Assuming that C(:) is a convex function, the best-replyof rm i is to invest at a level
that results in a probability of success i which solves the following rst-order condition:
(1  j) 1 + j2 = C 0(i):
In a symmetric equilibrium of the innovation game, both rms choose the same probability
 of success, which must be the unique solution of the following equation:
(1  ) 1 + 2 = C 0():
Let us now consider what happens if the two rms merge. We assume that there are
no complementarities in R&D, so that the merged entity can only coordinate the research
programs and the prices on the product market. The merged entity chooses the likelihood
of success 1 and 2 for the lab of rm 1 and that of rm 2, respectively. When only one
lab is successful, the merged entity obtains the monopoly prot 1. But when both labs are
successful, the merged entity coordinates the marketing of the two innovations which allows
it to obtain the total monopoly prot 2, which is larger than or equal to 1: For example, if
the two innovative products are identical, the prot 1 and 2 will be equal. By contrast, if
the products are di¤erentiated, the prot with two products is larger than with one product,
i.e., 2 > 1:
5The prot 2 can be positive in a homogeneous product setting if rms are able to collude (as assumed by
Federico, Langus and Valletti, 2017).
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The merged entitys prot can then be written as
1 (1  2) 1 + 2 (1  1) 1 + 122   C(1)  C (2) :
We assume in what follows - as Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017) implicitly do - that
the cost function C is convex enough to ensure that the prot function above is concave and
that it is optimal for the merged entity to invest the same amount in both research labs.6 In
this case, the prot is maximized at 1 = 2 = m; the solution of
max

2 (1  ) 1 + 22   2C():
The likelihood of success of each research project is then the solution of the optimality con-
dition:
(1  m) 1 + m (2  1) = C 0 (m) :
The comparison of the optimality condition for the merged entity and the equilibrium
condition with two independent rms leads to the following result:
Proposition 1 The merged entity invests more in innovation than independent duopolistic
rms if and only if 2 1 > 2; i.e., if the merged entitys incremental gain from a second
innovation is larger than the prot of an innovator when both rms innovate in the no-merger
scenario.
Another (immediate) implication of our analysis is that in the limiting case 2   1 =
2 = 0; the optimality rst-order conditions and, therefore, the levels of innovation in the
two scenarios coincide. The case 2   1 = 2 = 0 corresponds to a situation in which the
cannibalization between the two products is so large that the value of a second innovation
is zero for both an independent rm and the merged entity. This requires that products are
homogeneous and that rms compete à la Bertrand.
Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017) assume that products are identical but that rms are
able to collude if there are two successful innovators, which implies that 2   1 = 0 < 2:7
However, when there is some di¤erentiation between the two innovative products, it is possible
that 2   1 > 2; in which case the merged entity will invest more in innovation. We now
illustrate this in the Hotelling model.
3 Application to the Hotelling model
Consider the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs. Consumers are located
uniformly on a segment of size 1: Each rm is located at one extreme of the segment. Indexing
6Denicolò and Polo (2017) show that this property may not hold if C is only slightly convex.
7Feredico, Langus and Valletti (2018) relax this assumption.
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location from 0 to 1, we assume that rm 1 is located at x1 = 0 and rm 2 is located at
x2 = 1: An innovation by rm i 2 f1; 2g leads to a product whose consumption by a consumer
generates a gross utility U (if rm i does not innovate, it is not active in the market). To
purchase from rm i 2 f1; 2g, a consumer located at x incurs a transportation cost td2 where
d = jxi   xj is the distance to rm i. Thus, a consumer buying at price p from a rm at
distance d obtains utility U   td2   p. We assume in what follows that U  3t=4.
If a single rm innovates, it charges the monopoly price p = 2U3 and serves a share
q
U
3t of
the market if U < 3t, while it charges the price U   t and covers the market if U  3t. The
rm then obtains the monopoly prot 1 =
q
U
3t
2U
3 if U < 3t and 1 = U   t if U  3t.8 In
the duopoly case, if both rms innovate they compete by setting prices and consumers decide
where to buy. It is well known (see e.g., Tirole, 1988) that in equilibrium, each rm serves
half of the market at price p = t. It follows that the duopoly prot is 2 = t=2:
Suppose now that the two rms merge. If only one research lab succeeds in innovating,
the prot of the merged entity is 1. When both labs succeed, the merged entity can sell the
two products. When the rm sets a price p (for both products), the total demand is 1 as long
as p  U   t=4 (i.e. as long as the consumer located at an equal distance from both rms is
willing to buy), and is equal to 2
p
(U   p) =t for larger p: It is straightforward to show that, if
U  3t=4, the merged entity chooses the price p = U   t=4, serves all the market and obtains
a prot 2 = U   t=4:
The comparison of the incremental monopoly prot from a second innovation and a single
rm duopoly prot shows that for U=t > 1:362, we have9
2  1 > 2:
Proposition 2 In the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs and U=t > 1:362,
a merger leads to more innovation by the merging rms.
It is important to emphasize that the merger not only leads to more innovation but may
also benet consumers. More precisely, consumer surplus is given by:
CSM1 =
8<:
q
U
3t
2U
9 if U < 3t
2t
3 if U  3t
; CSM2 =
t
6
; CSD = U   13t
12
;
for the single-product monopoly case, the multi-product monopoly case and the duopoly
case, respectively. Therefore, the expected consumer surplus in the absence of a merger is
CS = 2 (1  )CSM1 + ()2CSD;
8We assume, for the sake of exposition, that marginal costs of production are equal to zero.
9 In the limiting case t = 0, this inequality becomes an equality.
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while in the case of a merger it is given by
CSM = 2M
 
1  MCSM1 +  M2CSM2:
Both functions are increasing in the range  2 [0; 1=2] from 0 to some upper bound, and
CS > CSM . Hence, in this range, a merger raises consumer surplus if M is su¢ ciently
larger than : More precisely, CSM > CS if and only if M > S () ; where S () is the
solution of
2S
 
1  SCSM1 +  S2CSM2 = 2 (1  )CSM1 + ()2CSD:
Note that S () exists only for  below a threshold ^ which is such that:
2^

1  ^

CSM1 +

^
2
CSD = max
1=2
2 (1  )CSM1 + 2CSD = CSM1
2
+
CSD
4
:
We conclude that  < M if and only if the marginal gain of innovation at S () is strictly
positive, which can be written as (using C 0 () = 1 +  (2  1)):
C 0
 
S ()

C 0 ()
<
1 + 
S () (2   21)
1 + 
 (2  1) :
As an illustration, we normalize the transport cost to t = 1 and consider the case in which
U = 2: Then ^ = 0:286 and
S () =
1
16
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2
p
3  9
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3
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27
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p
3
 
2 (1  )
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Assume now that C () = 1+
1+ where  > 0 and  is chosen so that the monopoly
maximization program has a symmetric solution (this implies that  is small). Then, a
merger to monopoly benets consumers if

S ()


<
q
2
3
4
3 + 
S ()

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4   2
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which is equivalent to
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We plot below the value of :
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Maximal curvature  as a function of 
A merger raises expected consumer surplus if  is not too large and  is su¢ ciently large. The
graph above shows that this is the case for  < 0:22 and  small. Therefore, when the
likelihood of innovation  in the no-merger scenario is relatively small and the innovation
technology does not involve strong decreasing returns to scale, a merger raises consumer sur-
plus despite the induced increase in prices.
4 Conclusion
This note derives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a merger between two competitors
to spur innovation when rms invest to bring new products to the market and the outcome
of R&D is stochastic. This condition is shown to hold in the Hotelling model with quadratic
costs whenever products are not too di¤erentiated. In this case, a merger not only increases
rmsincentives to invest in R&D but may also benet consumers.
References
Chen, Y. and M. Schwartz (2013), Product Innovation Incentives : Monopoly vs. Competi-
tion, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 22, 513-528.
Denicolò, V. and M. Polo (2018a), Duplicative Research, Mergers and Innovation, Eco-
nomics Letters, 166, 56-59.
Denicolò, V. and M. Polo (2018b), The Innovation Theory of Harm: An Appraisal, mimeo.
Federico, G., Langus, G. and T. Valletti, (2017), A Simple Model of Mergers and Innovation,
Economics Letters, 157, 136-140.
Federico, G., Langus, G. and T. Valletti, (2018), Horizontal Mergers and Product Innova-
tion, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 59, 1-23.
Greenstein, S. and G. Ramey (1998), Market Structure, Innovation and Vertical Product
Di¤erentiation, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 16, 285-311.
7
Katz, M. and H. Shelanski (2007), Mergers and Innovation, Antitrust Law Journal, 74, 1-86.
Motta, M. and E. Tarantino (2018), The E¤ect of Horizontal Mergers, When Firms Compete
in Prices and Investments, working paper.
Sah, R.K. and J.E. Stiglitz (1987), The Invariance of Market Innovation to the Number of
Firms, RAND Journal of Economics, 18, 98-108.
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press.
8
